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REFORM IN THE DETERMINATION
OF PRISON TERMS: EQUITY,
DETERMINACY, AND THE PAROLE
RELEASE FUNCTION
Peter B. Hoffman*t
Michael A. Stover**t
Traditional sentencing and parole practices1 have become the
subject of widespread criticism. Dean Norval Morris of the University of Chicago Law School, for example, has recently described
this country's sentencing procedures as "so arbitrary, discriminatory, and unprincipled that it is impossible to build a rational and
humane prison system on them." 2 Another prominent critic,
United States District Judge Marvin Frankel, has bluntly concluded that sentencing presently constitutes "a vast wasteland in
the law." 3 Others, including Andrew von Hirsch, 4 Alan Dershowitz, 5 David Fogel, 6 and the American Friends Service Committee, 7 have depicted the problems engendered by current practices in equally vivid terms.
These criticisms are based upon two major concerns: unwarranted sentencing disparity8 and indeterminacy. 9 Those advocat* Research Director, United States Parole Commission. B.A., 1966; M.A., 1969,
New York University; M.A., 1973; Ph.D., 1974, State University of New York at
Albany.
** Attorney, United States Parole Commission. B.A., 1968, Brown University;
J.D., 1973, George Washington University.
f The views expressed in this Article are personal and do not necessarily represent those of the United States Parole Commission or its individual members.
1. Since the parole release decision sets the actual duration of prison confinement, it is a sentencing decision for purposes of this Article.
2. N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 45 (1974) (emphasis in original).
3. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 54 (1972).
4. A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE (1976).
5. Dershowitz, Background Paper, in TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK
FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT
6. D. FOGEL, ..... WE ARE THE LIVING PROOF. . ." (1975).

(1976).

7. AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE (1971)

[hereinafter cited as STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE].
8. Although the term "sentencing disparity" is often used, few argue that all offenders should receive identical sentences. Rather, it is unwarranted or unjustifiable
differences in sentences among otherwise similarly situated offenders that is the subject of criticism.
9. The term "indeterminacy" has been used in criminal justice literature in
89
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ing reform seem to have achieved considerable consensus on the
goals desired: greater equity and more determinacy. However,
there is substantial disagreement regarding which structure and
procedures are most likely to achieve these goals. Meanwhile, various state legislative bodies are considering sentencing reform and
widely divergent statutes and proposed statutes are being produced. 10 On the federal level, the Senate has passed S. 1437" and
the House of Representatives is considering H.R. 13959.12 Al-

though these bills have major differences, both are designed to
recodify and reform the Federal Criminal Code, and both would
substantially alter federal sentencing practice.
At the same time, there is an increasing awareness in the
criminal justice field that unenvisioned and unintended consequences of reform proposals have too often aggravated, rather than
mitigated, the problems leading to their enactment.' 3 The intent of

this Article is to examine the probable consequences of various
sentencing reform strategies from an operational or practical perspective.
INDETERMINACY

Under present federal law 14 and
thority for determinining the actual
shared among the sentencing judge,
lesser extent, the prison system. 16 In

the laws of most states, 15 auduration of prison terms is
paroling authority, and, to a
adult federal cases, for exam-

various ways. In this Article, it refers to the practice of traditional parole boards of
deferring the decision concerning parole release until well after the sentence has begun.
10. For example, widely differing statutes relating to sentencing and parole
have recently been enacted. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1170-.6 (West Cum. Supp.
1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 947.165, .172-.174 (West Cum. Supp. 1979); Act of Apr. 5,
1978, ch. 723, 1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 705 (West); Act of July 20, 1978, ch. 481,
§§ 21-27, 1978 N.Y. Laws 848. See also the Federal Parole Commission and Reorganization Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4218 (1976).
11. 124 CONG. REC. S860 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1978).
12. H.R. 13959, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
13. A classic example is the experience of prohibition. More recently, a similar
concern has been raised by the expansion of diversionary programs. See Bollington,
Sprowls, Katkin & Phillips, A Critique of DiversionaryJuvenile Justice, 24 CRIME &
DELINQUENCY 59 (1978).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 4205 (1976).
15. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 921.141-.241 (West 1973 & Cum. Supp. 1978); ORt.
REV. STAT. §§ 144.175-.270 (1977-1978). See generally V. O'LEARY & K, HANRAHAN,
PAROLE SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES (3d ed. 1978).
16. In the federal system, credit for institutional good time reduces the maximum sentence and, thus, is available if parole is denied. The amount of reduction
varies, but generally a prisoner denied parole will be released by "good time" after

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol7/iss1/6

2

19781

REFORM IN THE DETERMINATION OF PRISON TERMS

Hoffman and Stover: Reform in the Determination of Prison Terms: Equity, Determinacy,

ple, a sentencing judge imposing a prison term of more than one
year prescribes a maximum sentence within the limit set by statute
for the offense. 1 7 In addition, the judge may impose a mimimum
sentence equal to one-third of the maximum imposed, a lesser
minimum, or no minimum at all.1 s Within the constraints of the
minimum sentence, if any, and the maximum sentence minus institutional good time, the actual duration of confinement is determined by the parole authority. 19 The timing of this durational decision is one focus of controversy.
Under traditional parole practice, the decision regarding when
a prisoner will be released is often deferred until well into the prisoner's sentence. A prisoner is given a parole hearing shortly before
completion of his or her minimum term. If the prisoner is not then
granted parole, further consideration after an additional period of
time 2 0 is often scheduled. Consequently, a prisoner may receive
several parole hearings before learning whether he or she will be
2
granted parole and when he or she will actually be released. '
From the perspective of the traditional rehabilitative model,
this practice is both necessary and desirable. Under a treatment
philosophy, parole release decisions are to be based primarily on
rehabilitative concerns. The goal of the parole release authority is
to identify the "optimum time" for the prisoner's release. Thus,
deferral of the release decision is necessary to enable rehabilitative
progress to be monitored. Furthermore, it may even be argued
that the uncertainty generated by this system has the positive function of motivating the prisoner to participate in rehabilitative programs.
After several decades of research, however, empirical evidence
generally fails to demonstrate that institutional rehabilitative programs are effective or that the "optimum time" for release can be
ascertained. 22 Behavior in prison does not appear to be a good predictor of future criminal conduct.
service of approximately two-thirds of the maximum sentence. See 18 U.S.C. §§
4163-4164 (1976).
17. 18 U.S.C. § 4205 (1976).

18. Id.
19. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4205, 4206 (1976).
20. For example, reconsideration may be scheduled at yearly intervals.
21. For a general overview of parole practices in the United States, see V.
O'LEARY & K. HANRAHAN, supra note 15.
22. See, e.g., D. LIPTON, R. MARTINSON & J. WILKS, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
CoRmscrioNAL TREATMENT (1975); Robison & Smith, The Effectiveness of Correctional Programs,17 CIUME & DELINQUENCY 67 (1971).
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Opponents of the traditional parole practice which defers the
durational decision maintain that the psychological stress engen23
dered by not knowing one's release date is morally unjustifiable.
This uncertainty has been cited as a substantial contributor to
prison unrest.2 4 It has been theorized that if determinacy is introduced into prison release decisions, not only will tensions created
by uncertainty be reduced, but participation in prison rehabilitative programs may show more positive effects25 since such partici26
pation will be voluntary, not merely to impress a parole board.
The lack of demonstrated effectiveness of the traditional rehabilitative model 27 renders the argument for an increase in determinacy compelling.28 The choice of the most effective method of accomplishing this goal, however, is not as straightforward. At first
glance, abolition of the parole release function-so that the judicially fixed sentence determines the time actually served-might
seem the most logical method. However, closer observation of this
suggestion exposes certain disadvantages.
Advocates of determinacy in sentencing generally do not support truly determinate prison terms. Rather, they argue that a prisoner should be given a firm release date contingent upon his or
her meeting a standard of institutional conduct. For example, while
California has recently eliminated the parole release function in all
but long term cases, it has created a "good time" mechanism in its
place. A prisoner's term of confinement can still be reduced by up
to one-third depending on institutional behavior. 29 Other determinate sentencing proposals go so far as to provide for "day for day"
good time. 30
To the extent that a system of good time release is substituted
for the parole function, discretion to control the release date by
23. See, e.g., D. FOGEL, supra note 6; N. MORIS, supra note 2.
24. See, e.g., NEW YORK STATE SPECIAL COMNMSSION ON ATrICA, ArbcA (1972).
25. That is, such participation may reduce recidivism.
26. See, e.g., N. MORRIS, supra note 2, at 43; Manson, Determinate Sentencing,
23 CiuME & DELINQUENCY 204, 205-06 (1977).
27. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
28. For a more extensive discussion of the issue of determinacy versus
durational deferral, see A. von Hirsch & K. Hanrahan, Abolish Parole? 13-14 (Sept.
1978) (summary of report submitted to National Institute of Law Enforcement and
Criminal Justice).
29. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2931 (West Cum. Supp. 1978). Three-twelfths of this
reduction is for absence of disciplinary infractions; one-twelfth is for participation in
institutional programming.
30. E.g., IND. CODE § 35-50-6-3 (Cum. Supp. 1978). Under such a provision, a
50% reduction of the actual prison term is possible.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol7/iss1/6

4

REFORM IN THE DETERMINATION OF PRISON TERMS

Hoffman and Stover: Reform in the Determination of Prison Terms: Equity, Determinacy,

defining and sanctioning institutional misbehavior is simply transferred from the parole board to the prison staff. Yet the liabilities
of institutional control of prison release decisions formed a prime
argument for the creation of independent releasing authorities,
3
parole boards, in the first place. '
In addition, determinate sentencing precludes consideration of
new information. Even if participation in rehabilitative programs
were to be totally discounted, there are other factors that may
32
change with time. For example, severe illness, effects of aging,
and assistance to institutional officials 33 are not thought of in the
context of rehabilitation, but presently may be considered in prison
release determinations. Similarly, public attitudes about an offense
for which a long sentence has been imposed may change over
time.3 4 There may also be cases in which a sentence that was
imposed when public feelings were intense appears, with the perspective of time, excessive.
Presently, it is the parole authority that is in the position to
deal with the various factors of the type listed above. If the parole
release function is eliminated, this discretion either will not be exercised, an alternative that appears unlikely, or, more likely, it
will be exercised by someone else. Institutional officials are the
prime candidates for such increased power, either directly, through
greater use of furloughs or other community treatment procedures, 35 or indirectly, through the power to petition a court for
36
resentencing.
Most important, elimination of the parole release function
would remove a prime check on sentencing disparity. This often
implicit but extremely important parole board function is discussed
31. See 4 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATrORNEY GENERAL'S SURVEY OF RELEASE
PROCEDURES 48-49 (1939). Congress established the first independent United States
Board of Parole in 1930, replacing institutional boards consisting of the Superintendent of Prisons and the warden and physician of each institution. Act of May 13, 1930,
Pub. L. No. 71-202, 46 Stat. 272. See especially the legislative history of this act, S.
REP. No. 537, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1930).
32. This factor may be particularly relevant in cases involving long sentences.
33. For example, prisoners may aid institutional officials in preventing escapes
or in identifying participants engaged in illegal conduct within the institution.
34. Such attitudinal changes are presently occurring regarding laws dealing
with illicit drugs.
35. See Largoy, Hussey & Kramer, A ComparativeAssessment of Determinate

Sentencing in Four Pioneer States, 24 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 385, 398, 400 (1978).
36. A recent Maine statute abolishes parole board power to release. Sentences
of imprisonment of more than one year are deemed tentative. The sentencing judge
may resentence a prisoner to a lesser term upon petition of institutional officials. ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1154 (West 1978).
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in a subsequent section of this Article.3 7
Whether these concerns justify retaining a paroling authority,
or whether substitutes are preferable, need not be argued at this
point. It is sufficient to emphasize that increased determinacy in
the imposition of prison terms is not incompatible with the existence or utility of a paroling authority. State parole boards in
Oregon and Minnesota, for example, presently operate under relatively "determinate" procedures. Each prisoner is given a hearing
shortly after commitment at which a presumptive date of release is
set contingent on avoidance of disciplinary infractions. 38 The
United States Parole Commission has also moved in this direction. 39 Thus, traditional indeterminacy and uncertainty are eliminated, while authority to sanction institutional misconduct by
postponing the presumptive date-or to advance the presumptive
date when substantial changes in circumstances occur-is preserved. Most significantly, this authority is retained by an agency
independent of the institutional chain of command. In addition to
removing unnecessary uncertainty, adoption of a presumptive date
system clarifies the paroling authority's role with respect to judicial
sentencing.
REDUCTION OF UNWARRANTED SENTENCING

DIsPARrY

The problem of unwarranted disparity in sentencing is the sec-

ond major concern of critics of traditional sentencing and parole
practices. As articulated by Marvin Frankel, "[tihe evidence is conclusive that judges of widely varying attitudes on sentencing, ad37. See text accompanying notes 40-57 infra.
38. See OR. AD. R. 254-30-005,-015; MINN.

DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, POLICY

AND PROCEDURES MANUAL § 7-104 (1978).

39. Present United States Parole Commission regulations governing presumptive date procedures, see 28 C.F.R. §§ 2.12-.14 (1978), provide that presumptive
dates be set within 120 days of commitment for all prisoners with sentences of less
than seven years. Id. § 2.12(a), (c)(1). Prisoners with longer sentences are given bearings when first eligible. Id. § 2.12(b). A presumptive date of up to four years is then
set or a four-year reconsideration bearing is scheduled. Id. § 2.1 2 (c)(2 ). Fewer than
4% of the 5,720 cases initially beard during the period from October 1977 to March
1978 were scheduled for four-year reconsideration bearings. However, the United
States Parole Commission recently adopted rules which will grant immediate bearings to all prisoners except those with minimum terms of 10 years or more, and will
allow presumptive dates to be set up to 10 years away. 44 Fed. Reg. 3404, 3405
(1979). The practical effect of this rule is to mandate presumptive dates (set within
120 days of confinement) for all but the most serious cases (estimated at fewer than
2% of prisoners committed each year).
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ministering statutes that confer huge measures of discretion, mete
out widely divergent sentences where the differences are explainable only by the variations among the judges, not by material differences in the defendants or their crimes." 40
The existence and extent of unwarranted sentencing disparity
is not a recent discovery. The literature on sentencing is replete
with examples of widely disparate sentences imposed on similarly
situated offenders. 41 In 1967, the President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and the Administration of Justice reported this problem as pervasive. 2 In 1973, the National Advisory Commission on
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals described sentencing prac43
tices in this country as appalling.
The problem of disparate sentencing is not merely one which
offends an abstract concern for uniformity; it squarely denies the
principle of "equal justice under the law." An excerpt from an
opinion by Justice Potter Stewart, written in 1958 while an appellate judge, is frequently quoted:
Justice is measured in many ways, but to a convicted criminal its
surest measure lies in the fairness of the sentence he receives.
.. . It is an anomaly that a judicial system which has developed
so scrupulous a concern for the protection of a criminal defendant throughout every other stage of the proceedings against him
should have so neglected this most important dimension of fun44
damental justice.
Awareness of disparate sentencing practices has been criticized
as interfering with the orderly process of justice when knowledgeable attorneys attempt to manipulate schedules to appear before
judges perceived to be lenient. 45 Prison officials have stressed that
disparities are particularly apparent when offenders are confined
together. This creates frustration and hostility that is demoralizing

40.

Frankel, supra note 3, at 21.

41. See, e.g., Bennett, The Sentence-Its Relation to Crime and Rehabilitation,
1960 ILL. L.F. 500, 502; Glueck, The Sentencing Problem, FED. PROBATION, Dec.
1956, at 15, 17.
42.

PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF

JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 23 (1967) [hereinafter cited as PREsIDENT'S COMM'N].
43. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL
GOALS, CORRECrIONS 142 (1973).

44.
45.

JUSTICE STANDARDS

AND

Shepard v. United States, 257 F.2d 293, 294 (6th Cir. 1958).
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 42, at 23-24.
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and counterproductive to rehabilitative efforts. 46
Unwarranted disparities in sentencing result from a combination of three primary factors: (1) lack of clearly defined and accepted sentencing goals, priorities, and criteria; (2) substantial discretion exercised by sentencing judges and paroling authorities in
the absence of such goals and criteria; and (3) the procedures under which this discretion is customarily exercised.
Sentencing and parole release decisions in this country have
largely been left to the unfettered discretion of the officials involved. Legislatures have traditionally set high maximum penalties
within which judges must choose specific sentences, but generally
have provided little guidance for the exercise of this choice. Although the purposes of sentencing have often been defined as
including deterrence, retribution, incapacitation, rehabilitation,
and community condemnation to maintain respect for law, 4 7 legislatures have been silent regarding which purposes are primary and
how conflicts among the purposes are to be resolved. For example,
federal law currently requires merely that in determining a sentence, the court consider "in its opinion the ends of justice and
best interest of the public." 48
In effect, sentencing policymaking has traditionally been delegated to a multitude of independent judges to be exercised in the
context of individual cases. 49 There has been no attempt to separate policymaking from individual sentencing determinations. Normally, some type of presentence investigation is available which attempts to provide an informational basis for an intelligent and
"individualized" sentencing decision. Yet, which factors should be
considered, under what circumstances, and how they are to be
weighted are decisions left solely to the unfettered discretion of the
individual decisionmakers. 50

46. See, e.g., J. BENNETT, OF PRISONS AND JUSTICE, S. Doc. No. 70, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). See also PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 42, at 23-24.
47. See, e.g., Note, Appellate Review of Primary Sentencing Decisions: A Connecticut Case Study, 69 YALE L.J. 1453, 1454-55 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Appel-

late Review].
48. 18 U.S.C. § 4205(b) (1976) (time of eligibility for parole release). Accord,
id. § 3651 (suspension of sentence and probation).
49. Prior to the use of parole guidelines, parole discretion was also unstructured on the federal level.
50. Such factors include but are not limited to: circumstances of the offense,
prior record, whether a guilty plea was entered, demeanor at trial, risk of recidivism,
and social background.
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Unfortunately, sentencing judges and paroling authorities generally have not attempted to fill this legislatively created gap by
formally articulating sentencing principles and criteria, nor have
sentencing and parole procedures been designed to identify the
criteria currently used. The United States Parole Commission is an
exception that is discussed in a subsequent section of this Article. 5 ' In the federal system, for example, reasons for judicial
sentencing decisions are not generally articulated, nor are they required, 52 multi-judge sentencing panels are used only in a few
scattered districts, 53 and appellate review of a sentence within the
statutory maximum is, for all practical purposes, unavailable. 54
Given this lack of guided, reasoned, or reviewable discretion, it is
not difficult to see how justifiable claims of arbitrary and capricious
decisionmaking and unwarranted disparity result.
Without articulation of an underlying sentencing policy, it is
questionable whether mere addition of procedural reforms, such as
sentencing panels, written reasons, and appellate review, would be
sufficient to produce the equity desired. A panel approach has
been the rule among parole boards, yet criticisms of disparate
parole decisionmaking have not been rare. 55 There is some evidence that merely providing written reasons in each case does not
appreciably reduce disparity, and that the reasons given tend to be
rote generalizations. 56 Moreover, without clearly articulated policy
and meaningful sentencing reasons
at the trial court level, appellate
57
ineffective.
be
to
likely
is
review
Strategiesfor DisparityReduction
Proposals for reducing unwarranted sentencing disparity essentially fall into two categories. Mandatory sentencing proposals comprise the first category. This approach seeks to maximize legislative
control of the penalty schedule. Judicial or administrative discre51.
52.
53.
54.

See text accompanying notes 75-88 infra.
Frankel, supra note 3, at 9.
Id. at 20-22.
Id. at 23-28.

55. See, e.g., CITIZENS' INQUIRY ON PAROLE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INC.,
SUMMARY REPORT ON NEW YORK PAROLE (1974).

56. See Rubin, Disparity and Equality of Sentences-A Constitutional Challenge, 40 F.R.D. 55, 57 (1966).
57. See Hoffman & DeGostin, An Argument for Self-Imposed Explicit Judicial
Sentencing Standards, 3 J. CRnM. JUST. 195, 197-98 (1975). See also Appellate Review, supra note 47, at 1461.
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tion in penalty determinations is to be minimized or eliminated en-

tirely. The second category consists of what may be described as

"sentencing guidelines" proposals, which aim at making the exer-

cise of discretion more structured and reasoned, rather than
eliminating it.
Mandatory Sentencing Proposals.-Thereare two basic types
of mandatory sentencing proposals, albeit with numerous varia-

tions. The simplest involves legislative establishment of a specific
penalty for each statutory offense, 5 8 or combination of statutory offense and prior record. 5 9 No judicial discretion is allowed, regard-

less of mitigating or aggravating circumstances, and no parole release is provided. 60 The second type of mandatory sentencing
proposal is called "presumptive sentencing." The legislature prescribes a sentence for each statutory offense or class of offenses,
but the sentencing judge may vary the penalty by a prescribed
amount 6 l if the judge finds mitigating or aggravating circumstances. 62 Recent legislation in California falls into this category. 6 3
The image of mandatory sentencing may appeal to lawmakers

and citizens who desire to make punishments more predictable. It
is also clear that legislators ought to give more attention to specifying the underlying rationale and priorities for imposition of crimi-

nal sanctions. However, there are a number of very troublesome
problems raised by mandatory sentencing approaches.

It is unlikely that any legislature will be able to specify in advance and in sufficient detail all the factors and combinations of factors necessary to eliminate judicial discretion while ensuring a sys58.

An example is a criminal code section which might read: "First degree burg-

lary shall be punished by imprisonment for three years."
59. Such a statute might read: "First degree burglary with one or more prior
felony convictions shall be punished by imprisonment for five years."
60. This approach has been recommended in STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra
note 7, at 144. A variant on this approach is the mandatory minimum sentence, which
does not specify the penalty to be imposed, but dictates what may not be imposed
(e.g., probation may not be granted if the offense involves use of a weapon). Since
this variant does not purport to be a comprehensive solution to the disparity problem, it is not addressed here.
61. This type of statute might provide: "Sale of narcotics shall be punished by
imprisonment for four years, plus or minus one year."
62. For instance, imprisonment may be increased from four to five years for
sale of narcotics to a minor.
63. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1170-.6 (West Cum. Supp. 1978). These restrictions
apply only to determining the length of prison terms; discretion to choose probation
or other sanctions lesser than imprisonment is not affected.
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tem congruent with present notions of equity and justice in
sentencing. As the Supreme Court has recently noted in Woodson
64

v. North Carolina:

This court has previously recognized that "[flor the determination of sentences, justice generally requires consideration of
more than the particular acts by which the crime was committed
and that there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense together with the character and propensities of the offender." . . . Consideration of both the offender and the offense

in order to arrive at a just and appropriate sentence has been
65
viewed as a progressive and humanizing development.
Furthermore, as Professor Franklin Zimring has pointed out, our
ability to define criminal acts in the context of legislation is limited:
Any system of punishment that attaches a single sanction to a
particular offense must define offenses with a morally persuasive
precision that present laws do not possess....
The problem is not simply that any such penal code will
make our present statutes look like Reader's Digest Condensed
Books; we lack the capacity to define into formal law the nuances
of situation, intent, and social harm that condition the serious66
ness of particular criminal acts.
This problem is less acute in presumptive sentencing proposals, which allow for limited sentencing discretion; however, it is
still substantial. There is little reason to believe that a narrow legislatively determined range of discretion would be sufficient to accommodate the more unusual cases, the very cases for which discretion is most required. Yet, if the legislative range is sufficiently
broad to accommodate such cases, the effect on present sentencing
disparity is likely to be minimal. Similarly, narrowly drawn legislative determinations of mitigating or aggravating factors which may
override a presumptive sentence are not likely to be sufficiently inclusive to encompass all appropriate exceptions, but broadly drawn
standards will provide only minimal discretionary control.

64. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
65. Id. at 304 (citation omitted) (quoting Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe,
302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937)). While the holding in this case, that failure to consider the

circumstances of the offense and the character and record of the offender is unconstitutional, was specifically restricted to the imposition of capital penalties, the underlying rationale would appear to apply to other sentencing dispositions.
66. Zimring, A Consumer's Guide to Sentencing Reform: Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, Dec. 1976, at 15-16.
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In addition, there is concern that if the legislature moves beyond its traditional role of specifying maximum permissible sentences for broad classes of criminal behavior and sets terms to be
actually served for specific offense behaviors, an unanticipated potential for severe increases in penalty lengths will result. Even if
the initial penalties appear reasonable, dramatic incidents, such as
a particularly brutal robbery occurring close to election time, may
provide insurmountable political pressure for increased sentences.
As noted by Marvin Frankel,
Many of our criminal laws are enacted in an access of righteous
indignation, with legislators fervidly outshouting each other,
with little thought or attention given to the large number of
years inserted as maximum penalties. Written at the random, accidental times when particular evils come to be perceived, the
statutes are not harmonized or coordinated with each other. The
67
resulting jumbles of harsh anomalies are practically inevitable.
Proponents of legislative sentencing may argue that the increased ability to project prison costs under a legislatively fixed
sentencing model will deter legislators from wholesale increases in
penalties. 68 However, this has not been demonstrated; it is equally
likely that, given more immediate political considerations, such deterrent effect will be minimal.
Moreover, there is concern that the legislative process is too
cumbersome for proper monitoring of sentencing practice and
modification of legislatively set terms. In addition, there may be
considerable legislative reluctance to respond to recommendations
for downward modification. 69 While harsh application of outmoded
penalties may result in considerable injustice, it is questionable
whether the types of persons who become enmeshed in the criminal justice system as criminal defendants and prisoners can engender the same degree of sympathy and public concern as those perceived to be innocent victims.
There is also substantial concern that by eliminating or
severely restricting judicial discretion, a mandatory sentencing approach will merely shift the exercise of discretion to the prosecutor, who selects which crimes to charge and controls the plea bargaining process. Professor Albert Alschuler has summarized this
concern:
67.
68.

M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES 9 (1973).
D. FOGEL, supra note 6, at 258-60.

69. Although laws governing private sexual relationships among consenting
adults are rarely, if ever, enforced, they are quite resistant to legislative repeal.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol7/iss1/6

12

1978]

REFORM IN THE DETERMINATION OF PRISON TERMS

Hoffman and Stover: Reform in the Determination of Prison Terms: Equity, Determinacy,

In my view, fixed and presumptive sentencing schemes of the
sort commonly advocated today (and of the sort enacted in
California) are unlikely to achieve their objectives so long as they
leave the prosecutor's power to formulate charges and to bargain
for guilty pleas unchecked. Indeed, this sort of reform is likely
to produce its antithesis-to yield a system every bit as lawless
as the current sentencing regime but one in which discretion is
concentrated in an inappropriate agency and in which the benefits of this discretion are made available only to defendants who
70
sacrifice their constitutional rights.
While disparity might appear to be reduced by a mandatory
or presumptive penalty scheme, the problem would actually be
masked: discretion would merely be shifted and hidden. In fact,
the disparity problem is likely to become exacerbated; when the
exercise of discretion becomes less visible, it becomes less subject
to control.
A Guideline Model.-The "guidelines" model, a substantially
different alternative, is preferred by the writers of this Article. The
legislature continues its traditional practice of setting the maximum
permissible penalties for broad classes of criminal conduct. However, it also articulates general principles to guide the imposition of
such penalties. The task of formulating explicit sentencing policy
under these standards is delegated to a smaller and more specialized body. 7 1 This body develops explicit sentencing guidelines by
identifying the primary factors to be considered in sentencing and
how they should be weighed. For each combination of major factors, the guidelines specify a particular penalty or penalty range.
The individual sentencing decisionmaker is required to apply the
guidelines to each case. Normally, a decision within the guideline
range is expected. However, discretion to depart from the guidelines is retained, provided adequate on-the-record justifications for
72
such departure are supplied.
Consequently, each defendant is informed how the guideline
range for his or her case was calculated and the specific reasons for
any departure from the sentence or range prescribed by the
70. Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and ProsecutorialPower: A Critique of Recent Proposalsfor "Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, in NATIONAL INSTITUTE
OF LAW ENFORCEMENT

AND

CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

DETEMIINATE

SENTENCING-

REFOR OR REGRESSION? 59, 59 (1978) (footnotes omitted).
71. This smaller specialized body might be a sentencing commision, a committee of the judiciary, a paroling authority, or some combination of these groups.
72. See note 86 infra and accompanying text.
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guidelines. This system focuses on departures from customary policy, which is represented by the applicable guideline range. Thus,
it is likely to avoid generalized reasons, which tend to be given
when reasons are required without articulation of underlying policy.

73

In addition, a guidelines system facilitates appellate review. In
contrast to jurisdictions in which appellate review of sentencing is
currently provided, such review under a guidelines system has a
specific focus. Two sequential questions are asked. First, were the
guidelines correctly applied? Second, if a sentence outside the
guidelines was imposed, were the reasons given for the departure
sufficient; 74 or, if the decision was within the guidelines, was com-

pliance with customary policy unreasonable? Furthermore, the
guideline setting authority monitors guideline usage on an ongoing
basis to ensure compliance and consider circumstances warranting
further specification, classification, or modification of the guideline
standards.
An operating example of a guidelines model is provided by the
United States Parole Commission. 75 The Commission, faced in the
late 1960's and early 1970's with criticisms similar to those now leveled at sentencing judges, 76 established a pilot project 77 which featured hearings conducted by panels of two hearing examiners, written reasons in cases of parole denial, an administrative review
process, and use of decision guidelines. Based on experience with
this pilot project, revised decisionmaking procedures incorporating
these features were developed and applied to all federal parole decisions. 78 In 1976, the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act
mandated continued use of these features, including the guidelines
system.

79

The guidelines matrix is depicted in Table I. It consists of a
73.

Absent a clear articulation of underlying policy, written reasons tend to be

routine and boilerplate. See note 56 supra and accompanying text.
74. Appellate review is necessarily ineffective without precise reasons stated
by the sentencing judge. See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
75. Formerly the United States Board of Parole. (The agency's name was
changed in 1976).
76. These criticisms include charges of standardless decisions, as well as
arbitrary and disparate decisionmaking. See K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE
126-42 (1969).
77. This project commenced in 1972.
78. Expansion to all federal parole decisions was accomplished as of October
1974. Present regulations are codified in 28 C.F.R. §§ 2.1-.58 (1978), as amended by
44 Fed. Reg. 3404, 3405 (1979) (to be codified in 28 C.F.R. §§ 2.12,.14).
79. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4218 (1976). These guidelines were originally developed
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two-axis chart. The vertical axis determines the severity or gravity
of the prisoner's present offense behavior. Seven categories of offense severity are designated. 8 0 For each, the Commission has
supplied examples of common offense behaviors. These examples
were determined by consensus judgment of Commission members.8 ' Not all possible offense behaviors are listed. Those not
listed are categorized by comparison with similar offense behaviors
which are listed, or by interpolation or extrapolation therefrom. On
the horizontal axis, four categories of parole prognosis, from very
good to poor, are defined. An actuarial device known as a salient
factor score (see Table II) was empirically developed to aid in mak82
ing prognosis assessments.
For each combination of offense (severity) and offender (parole
prognosis) characteristics, a guideline range is provided. This decisional range indicates customary parole policy by specifying the
number of months to be served before release, 8 3 assuming the
prisoner demonstrates good institutional behavior. Thus, an adult
parole applicant with a low moderate severity offense, for example
forgery of less than $1,000, and good parole prognosis, indicated by
a salient factor score of 6-8, can expect to serve between twelve
and sixteen months before parole release. A very high severity/
poor risk case, on the other hand, such as an armed robbery and a
salient factor score of 0-3, can expect to serve from sixty to
seventy-two months, absent exceptional circumstances. For the
most serious cases, including murder and kidnapping, the guidelines do not specify upper limits. Decisions in the small number of
as part of a three-year study of parole decisionmaking. The study was funded by the
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and was conducted by the Research
Center of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency. This was a collaborative
effort among parole board members, their staff, and research staff. For a description
of the development of these guidelines, see D. GOTrFREDSON, L. WILKINS & P.
HOFFMAN, PAROLE AND SENTENCING GUIDELINES (1978) [hereinafter cited as
PAROLE AND SENTENCING GUIDELINES].
80. In determining the appropriate severity rating, the Commission may look
beyond the offense of conviction to consider mitigating or aggravating factors. U.S.
Parole Comm'n Research Unit, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Guideline Application Manual,
4.08-.10 (U.S. Parole Comm'n Research Unit Rep. No. 16, 1977) (adopted by the Commission as Appendix 4, U.S. Parole Comm'n Procedure Manual, on May 1, 1978)
(hereinafter cited as Guideline Application Manual]. See also Billiteri v. United
States Board of Parole, 541 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1976); Bistram v. United States Board
of Parole, 535 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); Zannino v. Arnold, 531 F.2d 687
(3d Cir. 1976); Lupo v. Norton, 371 F. Supp. 156 (D. Conn. 1974).
81. See PAROLE AND SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 79, at 41-67.
82. Id. at 69-80.
83. This policy is subject to the limitations of the judicially imposed sentence.
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REVISION EFFECTIVE 4/1/77

TABLE II
SALIENT FACTOR SCORE
Register Number

Name

IT E M A ..................................................................
No prior convictions (adult or juvenile) = 3
One prior conviction = 2
Two or three prior convictions = 1
Four or more prior convictions = 0
IT E M B ..................................................................
No prior incarcerations (adult or juvenile) = 2
One or two prior incarcerations = 1
Three or more prior incarcerations = 0
IT E M C ..................................................................
Age at first commitment (adult or juvenile)
26 or older = 2
18-25 = 1
17 or younger = 0

F-1
F-1

:ITE M D ..................................................................
Commitment offense did not involve auto theft or
check(s) (forgery/larceny) = 1
Commitment offense involved auto theft [X], or
check(s) [Y], or both [Z] = 0
:ITE M E ..................................................................
Never had parole revoked or been committed for a
new offense while on parole, and not a probation
violator this time = 1
Has had parole revoked or been committed for a
new offense while on parole [X], or is a probation
violator this time [Y], or both [Z] = 0
IT E M F ..................................................................
No history of heroin or opiate dependence = 1
Otherwise = 0
IT E M G ..................................................................
Verified employment (or full-time school attendance)
for a total of at least 6 months during the last 2
years in the community = 1
Otherwise = 0

F-1
l

TOTAL SCORE ........................................................
NOTE TO EXAMINERS:
If item D or E is scored 0, place the appropriate letter (X, Y or Z) on the line to the right
of the box.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1978

19

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW
Hofstra
Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [1978], [Vol.
Art. 67: 89

cases in this category'" must be made by comparing with and
extrapolating from the offenses and time ranges in the immediately
preceding severity level.
Decisions above or below the guidelines must be for "good
cause" and accompanied by specific written reasons. 8 5 For example, aggravating factors, such as unusual cruelty toward the victim,
a particularly large scale or unusually sophisticated offense behavior,
or a repetitive pattern of assaultive conduct, may justify a decision
above the guidelines if specific factual support is provided. Similarly, diminished mental capacity, a poor prognosis score resulting
exclusively from trivial prior offenses, or severe medical problems
could support a decision below the guidelines range.86 During the
period from October 1976 to September 1977, approximately
10,000 decisions were rendered at initial parole hearings. In eighty
percent of these cases, the Commission's decisions were within the
guidelines range; decisions above or below the guidelines were
87
made in twenty percent of the cases.
By Commission policy, revision of the guideline model is
periodically considered.8 8 The Commission can examine the adequacy of reasons specified in prior cases for departure from the
guidelines and determine whether there are recurring circumstances that require supplemental policy or policy clarification. In
addition, the Commissioners can consider whether modification of
the offense behavior classifications, predictive device (salient factor
score), or guideline ranges is warranted.
ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR
DETERMINING ACTUAL DURATION OF PRISON TERMS

Combining a procedure for setting presumptive parole dates at
initial hearings held shortly after commitment with a guideline sys84. Of the 5720 prisoners given initial hearings during the six month period
from October 1977 to March 1978, fewer than 2.5% had offenses rated in the Greatest
II Severity category.
85. Federal law provides that the prisoner must be given written notice stating
with particularity reasons for any departure from the guidelines. 18 U.S.C. § 4206(c)
(1976).
86. Examples of the circumstances that warrant decisions outside the guidelines are listed in Guideline Application Manual, supra note 80, at 4.1-.17.
87. See B. Stone-Meierhoefer, Workload and Decision Trends: Statistical
Highlights 10174-9/77, at RIO (U.S. Parole Comm'n Research Unit Rep. No. 18, 1977).
This 20% figure includes only discretionary decisions outside the guidelines. Decisions limited by the judicial sentence were not considered discretionary guideline
departures. See id. at R16 note.
88. 28 C.F.R. § 2.20(g) (1978).
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tem8 9 provides relative determinacy and reduces unwarranted disparity in prison terms. Yet it is not sufficient for parole boards to
use decision guidelines, while judicial discretion is left unfettered.
Parole boards cannot affect unwarranted disparity in nonprison sentences or in judicial constraints on parole board action. 90 Thus, efforts are now being made in several jurisdictions to apply a
guideline model to judicial sentencing decisions. 9 1
Congress, in the context of revising the Federal Criminal
Code, 92 is considering the extension of a guideline system to judicial sentencing decisions. One issue of concern is the appropriate
role, if any, for the paroling authority. There are at least two
clearly distinguishable strategies for allocation of sentencing power
under a guideline system.
The "single authority model" eliminates the parole release
function. The sentencing judge determines, pursuant to guidelines,
the nature of the sentence: the fine, probation period, jail term, or
term of imprisonment. 93 Terms of imprisonment, once imposed,
are served in full, possibly subject to reduction for acceptable institutional behavior.
The "dual authority model' divides responsibility between the
judiciary and the parole board. As in the single authority model,
the sentencing judge decides, pursuant to guidelines, whether to
impose a fine, probation period, jail term, or term of imprisonment. However, the actual duration of any term of imprisonment
imposed is determined by the paroling authority pursuant to
guidelines and presumptive date procedures. This division of authority could be absolute, 9 4 or judicial authority to limit the maxi89.

The United States Parole Commission and several state paroling authorities

presently operate under guidelines/presumptive date models; other parole boards
have developed similar procedures. Parole authorities in Florida, Minnesota,
Oregon, and Washington are utilizing guidelines/presumptive date models. Florida
Parole and Probation Comm'n, Objective Parole Guidelines Application Manual
(Nov. 1978); Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 723, 1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 705 (West); OR.
REv. STAT. §§ 144.175-.270 (1977-1978); Washington State Board of Prison Terms and
Parole, Guidelines for Fixing Minimum Terms (Dec. 1, 1978). The New York Board
of Parole has adopted a guideline model with some presumptive date features. N.Y.
CODES RULES & REGS. tit. 9, §§ 8001-8002.3 (1978).
90. That is, constraints may be placed on parole board action by inappropriately high judicial minimum or inappropriately low judicial maximum sentences.
91. See L. WiKmNS, J. KRESS, D. GOTTFREDSON, J. CALPIN & A. GELMAN,
SENTENCING GUIDELINES: STRUCTURING JUDICIAL DISCRETION (1978).
92. 18 U.S.C. (1976).
93. For the purposes of this Article, imprisonment is exclusively defined to include sentences to penal institutions for periods in excess of one year. This term
must be distinguished from jail sentences, which include terms of one year or less.
94. For example, in the state of Washington if a judge decides to impose a
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mum term could be retained. 95
On the surface, the first strategy appears more tidy in that it
functions with a single decisionmaking authority: the judiciary.
However, theoretical tidiness is not much comfort if the proposal
unravels when put into practice. Consequently, it is essential that
each strategy be examined and its ability to achieve desired goals
assessed.
Four goals are identified for purposes of analysis: (1) Reducing
unwarranted disparity in the actual duration of prison terms; (2)
reducing uncertainty or indeterminacy, without precluding the
ability to respond to significant changes in circumstances; (3)
ensuring fair and effective administration of prison discipline; and
(4) avoiding excessive incarceration and skyrocketing prison populations. These goals are considered in the context of the federal reform effort. The underlying principles, however, apply equally to
state systems.
The Impact on Disparity
Both the single and dual authority models provide for judicial
determination of the nature of the sentence pursuant to a guidelines system. Under the single authority model, the sentencing
judge also determines the actual duration of prison confinement;
whereas in the dual authority model, this decision is made by a
separate, specialized authority. We now turn to a primary question: Which model is more likely in practice to provide reduction
in unwarranted disparity?
Under the single authority model proposed in S. 1437,96 determination of actual duration of prison confinement is shifted from
the parole authority to the sentencing judge. Sentences of imprisonment in almost all cases would be served in full without the possibility of parole release, 97 and statutory reduction for good behavprison term the offender must be committed for the statutory maximum provided for
the offense. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.95.010 (1977).
95. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
96. S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). This Article deals with §§ 101 and 124
of the bill. Id. §§ 101, 124. Section 101 of the bill, if enacted, will amend Title 18
of the United States Code regarding, inter alia, sentencing guidelines. All subsequent
textual and footnote references to § 101 of the bill are to the proposed section numbers in Title 18 of the United States Code, and are hereinafter cited as Proposed 18
U.S.C. Section 124 of the bill, if enacted, will amend Title 28 of the United States
Code to establish a Sentencing Commission. All subsequent textual and footnote
references to § 124 of the bill are to proposed section numbers in Title 28 of the
United States Code, and are hereinafter cited as Proposed 28 U.S.C.
97. Proposed 28 U.S.C., supra note 96, § 944(b)(2). This is not to be confused
with the provision of parole supervision. Under the proposed amendments to Title
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ior is very limited. 98 A statement of specific reasons for any

sentence outside the guidelines is required,9 9 and there is a limited right of appellate review. 10 0 A Sentencing Commission is es-

tablished to issue guidelines and policy statements, 10 but it lacks
responsibility or authority to review individual cases, except for re02
search purposes after the actual decisions have been made.'

While it seems clear that the introduction of such guidelines
would provide some reduction of disparity in the present totally
structureless area of judicial sentencing, 0 3 there are serious obsta-

cles that would prevent a single authority model from controlling
unwarranted disparity in the actual duration of prison terms with

anywhere near the effectiveness of the dual authority model. 10 4 Indeed, such disparity is likely to increase under the single authority
model proposed in S. 1437.
"The judiciary" actually consists of an extremely large number
of highly decentralized decisionmakers 0 5 with a strong tradition of
independence. Decisions are made by single individuals.'0 More-

over, many judges hold very firm beliefs about "individualized"
sentencing. While judicial independence historically has protected
private freedoms against government abuse, it has also made it dif-

ficult to coordinate and direct judges. Such independence is demonstrated by the wide divergence in probation supervision practice
18 of the United States Code, a period of parole supervision is a separate and additional part of all sentences in excess of one year. Proposed 18 U.S.C., supra note 96,
§9 2304, 3841, 3843.
98. Proposed 18 U.S.C., supra note 96, § 3824(b). Three days credit for institutional good behavior is given at the end of each calendar month after the first year of
imprisonment. See text accompanying notes 129 & 130 infra.
99. Proposed 18 U.S.C., supra note 96, § 2003(b).
100. Id. § 3725.
101. Proposed 28 U.S.C., supra note 96, §§ 991, 994(a).
102. Id. §§ 994(q), 995.
103. This is especially true regarding the choice of probation or incarceration.
104. Serious limitations to obtaining consistency in judicial sentencing even
with a guidelines model are discussed below. See text accompanying notes 105-112
infra. For judicial decisions concerning the character of the sentence, which are presently totally unstructured, a guidelines model should, nevertheless, achieve a substantial improvement over current practice.
105. Recently enacted legislation provides for a substantial increase in the
number of United States district judges (bringing the total authorized number to approximately 500). Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-483, 92 Stat. 1629. Currently,
there are 398 district judgeships authorized.
106. As indicated earlier, the use of multi-judge "sentencing councils" is rather
limited. See note 53 supra and accompanying text. In addition, judicial sentencing
councils are merely advisory; the individual sentencing judge retains actual decisionmaking power.
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federal judicial districts. 10 7 The Administra-

among the ninety-two
tive Office of United States Courts performs the function proposed
for the Sentencing Commission: providing a central office to
coordinate judicial and probation operations. However, the Administrative Office has not produced uniformity among the federal districts.' 08 For example, a recent General Accounting Office study
found wide district-to-district disparity in minimum required contact levels of probation officer case supervision, despite relatively
clear standards issued by the Administrative Office. 0 9
Moreover, guideline assessments under S. 1437 are likely to
be delegated to the probation staff that presently prepares presentence investigations, introducing an even larger number of agents
into the process." 0 It is unlikely that the detailed instruction and
ongoing training necessary for guidelines to be operationally effective can be given to such vast numbers of personnel. Obviously
such instruction and training cannot be provided as effectively as it
can to the much smaller group of members and examiners who
comprise the paroling authority."' This distinction is crucial because what is actually applied with a guidelines system is a complex set of standards and principles, rather than a simple set of
mandatory rules.
In addition, decisions relating to sentencing in general, and
terms of imprisonment in particular, are but a small part of the judicial role. On the average, a federal judge annually imposes fewer
than thirty sentences of imprisonment which exceed one year."12
Not only does the part-time nature of this task preclude developing
proficiency in applying guidelines consistently, but it also limits
each judge's exposure to the broad range of cases involving prison
terms. Such exposure is important because sentencing involves
complex comparative judgments; guidelines aid in, rather than substitute for, making these judgments.
107. Federal probation officers in each district are appointed by and report to
the Chief District Judge.
108. This is not intended as a criticism of the personnel involved; rather, it is
noted as an inherent structural limitation.
109. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, PROBATION AND PAROLE AcTIvrrIES NEED TO BE BETTER MANAGED (1977).
110. There are presently 1,697 United States probation officers.
111. There are nine parole commissioners, 18 U.S.C. § 4202 (1976), and 36
hearing examiners.
112. Statement of Cecil C. McCall, Chairman, United States Parole Commission, presented to the Criminal Justice Subcommittee of the House Judiciary
Committee (Apr. 18, 1978) (on file in office of the Hofstra Law Review).
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In contrast, the parole authority is composed of a small group
of decisionmakers who determine the length of prison confinements on a full-time basis, vote in panels rather than individually, 113 and see the entire spectrum of defendants sentenced to imprisonment. Thus, the structure of a paroling authority under a
guideline system contains substantial additional checks that control
unwarranted disparity. These include: (1) A small number of
decisionmakers, which facilitates consultation, sharing views, and
intensive and ongoing training; (2) panel as opposed to individual
decisionmaking; (3) guideline application on a primary, or full-time,
rather than a secondary, or part-time, basis; (4) exposure to the full
spectrum of defendants sentenced to prison, rather than to a narrow slice of such cases; and (5) considerable isolation from potential
local pressures. In our opinion, a guidelines system can be of substantial utility. However, it is a major error to expect it to work
without carefully designed supplemental checks.
Proponents of the single authority model argue that an adequate compliance mechanism is provided by S. 1437's provision for
appellate review. However, such an argument is not persuasive for
several reasons. There are drastic limitations on the scope of appellate review, apparently out of concern that the already overworked
appellate courts would not be able to handle a large added burden
from sentencing appeals. Under S. 1437, a defendant can only appeal a sentence that is above the guidelines. 11 4 There is no right to
appeal a sentence within or below the guidelines, even if the defendant can make a persuasive argument that mitigating factors
warranting a lower sentence are present. Moreover, there appears
to be no right to appeal on the basis of an alleged misapplication of
the guideline range or misinterpretation of the factors deter5
mining the guideline range selected.,
113.

Regulations governing Parole Commission decision quorums are contained

in 28 C.F.R. § 2.17 (1978). Appellate regulations are contained in 28 C.F.R.

§§

2.25-.27 (1978).
114. Proposed 18 U.S.C., supra note 96, § 3725. In addition, the government

may appeal a sentence below the guidelines. However, the defendant may not appeal a sentence equal to or less than that recommended or not opposed by the prosecutor pursuant to a plea agreement. The defendant also may not appeal if the sentence actually imposed was specified in the accepted plea agreement. Similarly, the
government may not appeal if the sentence imposed is equal to or greater than that
recommended or not opposed by the prosecutor, or if the sentence actually imposed
was specified in the accepted plea agreement.

115. The defendant's right to challenge the legality of a sentence under rule 35
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, FED. R. CtLM. P. 35, is of limited value,
since a misapplication of the guidelines may not always amount to clear illegality.
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In addition, there is little indication that the decisions of the
numerous panels of the eleven courts of appeals will provide a
truly consistent and rational sentencing policy. The sentencing
judge may depart from the guidelines whenever he or she finds
that "an aggravating or mitigating circumstance exists that was not
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission
in formulating the guidelines and that should result in a different
sentence." 11 6 The standard for appellate reversal is a finding that
the sentence is "unreasonable."" 7 Thus, diverse trial and appellate
court departures from sentences recommended by the guidelines
are inevitable. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that already overworked appellate courts will assume an activist role in sentencing
review. Clearly, there is no historical tradition of appellate involvement with sentencing review; rather, considerable deference is
paid to the trial judge's ability to observe the defendant.'1 8 These
concerns are highlighted by Andrew von Hirsch and Kathleen
Hanrahan in a discussion of the utility of the dual authority model:
"It will be difficult enough [even with the introduction of appellate
review of sentences] to ensure that these individual [judicial]
decision-makers abide by the [Sentencing] Commission's standards
in their 'in-out' decisions [whether to imprison or grant probation].
The standards concerning duration of imprisonment are apt to be
still more complex and difficult to police."119 1t should be noted
that under current parole law, administrative review by a specialized section of the Parole Commission may be obtained by any
prisoner denied parole.' 20
Determinacy, Changing Circumstances, and
DisciplinaryInfractions
It might appear that a single authority model would provide
more determinacy than the dual authority model. However, a dual
authority structure, coupled with a presumptive release date plan,
would be just as effective in eliminating gross indeterminacy. Fur116. Proposed 18 U.S.C., supra note 96, § 2003(a)(2).
117. See id. § 3725(e).
118. As stated by Judge Marvin Frankel in an argument advocating appellate
review of sentences: "The uses of the trial and the sentencing bearing for appraising
the defendant in relevant respects are much overrated. The trial judge's powers of

effective observation are likewise exaggerated; some judges are astute peoplewatchers and may sometimes learn useful things. But the whole subject is overblown ....

" M. FRANKEL, supra note 67, at 83.

119. A von Hirsch & K. Hanrahan, supra note 28, at 42.
120.

18 U.S.C. § 4215 (1976).
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thermore, advocates of determinate sentencing do not generally
support absolute determinacy. 12 1 Therefore, the important question is: How do the two models screen and treat cases involving
"changed" circumstances, including disciplinary infractions?
Such circumstances may be classified into four categories: (1)
Circumstances relevant to the defendant that are unknown or
unforeseen at the time of sentencing (e.g., severe illness, effects of
aging in long term cases, help to prison or prosecutorial authorities); (2) circumstances concerning classes of individuals (e.g., severe prison overcrowding, reduced societal evaluation of the seriousness of particular offenses); (3) circumstances relating to disciplinary infractions; and (4) circumstances relating to achievement
in institutional programs.
Unforeseen Individual Circumstances.-Under the single authority model proposed in S. 1437, the Director of the Bureau of
Prisons is authorized to petition the court for resentencing in exceptional circumstances. 122 However, because the federal prison
system is decentralized, this would increase the number of decisionmakers upon whom reliance to initiate such requests would
be placed. 123 The effectiveness of this provision in reducing
unwarranted disparity also depends on consistent responses from
the judiciary to petitions for resentencing, raising the potential disparity problem noted earlier.' 2 4 Moreover, there is no provision
for periodic review by the original decisionmaker to ascertain the
existence of exceptional circumstances-a troublesome void when
the population concerned is not particularly articulate.
In contrast, the dual authority model provides an efficient vehicle for more consistent responses to exceptional circumstances.
Such circumstances can be brought to the attention of the parole
authority by a petition of the prisoner or warden, or discovered at
formal periodic reviews of each presumptive date. 12 5
121.
122.

See text accompanying notes 29 & 30 supra.
Proposed 18 U.S.C., supra note 96, § 2302(b)(1).

123. There are presently 39 federal institutions, with numerous case managers
and classification personnel. Furthermore, expanded use is being made of state facilities which each house small numbers of federal prisoners.
124. See notes 40-57 supra and accompanying text.
125. Current federal law provides for periodic reviews of parole denials at least
once each 18 months for prisoners with sentences of more than one year and less
than seven years; and at least once each 24 months for prisoners with sentences of
seven years or more. 18 U.S.C. § 4208(h) (1976). Parole Commission regulations in
28 C.F.R. § 2.14(a) (1978) provide in part:
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Reduced Societal Attitudes or Severe Overcrowding.-A single

authority model cannot respond efficiently to prisoners with of126
fenses towards which societal attitudes have grown more lenient.
The Sentencing Commission may reduce guideline penalties prospectively under S. 1437.127 However, there is no mechanism for
reevaluating cases already sentenced. Similarly, although the Sentencing Commission is given a mandate to consider overcrowding, 128 it can only act prospectively. Thus, in either case, disparity

between prisoners sentenced before and after a change in the
guidelines occurs would remain.
In contrast, the dual authority model provides a considerably
more efficient vehicle for responding to such circumstances. If societal attitudes toward particular offenses become more tolerant, retrospective advancement of presumptive release dates can be made.
To alleviate overcrowding, a parole authority can make immediate

but smaller changes more equally throughout the prison population. It is not suggested that a parole authority should be routinely
used for adjusting institutional populations; rather, the unique abil-

ity afforded by the dual authority model to react equitably to se-

(a) Interim proceedings. The purpose of an interim proceeding required
by 18 U.S.C. 4208(h) shall be to consider any significant developments or
changes in the prisoner's status that may have occurred subsequent to the
initial hearing.
(3) Following an interim hearing, the Commission may:
(i) Order no change in the previous decision;
(ii) Advance a presumptive release date, or the date of a four-year reconsideration hearing. However, it shall be the policy of the Commission that
once set, a presumptive release date or the date of a four-year reconsideration hearing shall not be advanced except upon clearly exceptional circumstances;
(iii) Retard or rescind a presumptive parole date for reason of disciplinary infractions.
In addition, 28 C.F.R. § 2.15 (1978) provides:
When a prisoner has served the minimum term of imprisonment required by law, the Bureau of Prisons may petition the responsible Regional
Commissioner for reopening the case under § 2.28 and consideration for
parole prior to the date set by the Commission at the initial or review hearing. The petition must show cause why it should be granted, i.e., an
emergency, hardship, or the existence of other extraordinary circumstances
that would warrant consideration of early parole.
126. Examples of such offenses include selective service and certain drug offenses.
127. Proposed 28 U.S.C., supra note 96, §§ 994(b)(2), 994(j).
128. Id. § 994(g).
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vere overcrowding in a manner not possible under the single authority model is emphasized.
Disciplinary Infractions.-Disciplinary infractions present a

somewhat different concern. Although earlier drafts eliminated
"good time" completely, S. 1437, as it passed the Senate, allows
three days credit for institutional good time that vests monthly.
Since neither vested nor future good time can be forfeited, the
limit on lost good time is three days for any and all infractions
occurring within the course of one month. 129 Thus, if a prisoner violates an institutional rule, he or she can only lose the good time
to be earned during that month. Consequently, there is severe
doubt that S. 1437 provides a sufficient sanction for serious institutional misconduct. However, increasing the amount of institutional
good time that can be awarded has the liability of increasing institutional power.130 Again, the dual authority model can more efficiently sanction misconduct, and is free of institutional dominance.
For example, if a total of twenty percent good time reduction is
deemed sufficient, the legislation could specify that the initial presumptive date be set no later than upon completion of eighty percent of the judicial maximum sentence. Thereafter, a presumptive
date could be postponed by the paroling authority, for a period of
up to twenty percent of the original sentence, upon a due process
finding of institutional misconduct.
Rehabilitative Programming.-UnderS. 1437, participation in

rehabilitative programs cannot be considered in release determinations unless the judge at the time of sentencing deems the case exceptional and provides for parole eligibility. 13 1 Despite the apparent general lack of effectiveness of present rehabilitative programs,
few would preclude the possibility that specialized programs which
demonstrably reduce recidivism for certain types of prisoners will
be discovered. Under S. 1437, even minimal incentives or rewards
for rehabilitative participation are barred.
The dual authority/presumptive date model, however, allows
limited advancement of presumptive dates upon completion of
129. Proposed 18 U.S.C., supra note 96, § 3824(b) provides that a prisoner
serving a term of more than one year, other than a life term, can earn up to three
days good time per month.
130. See text accompanying notes 31, 35 & 36 supra; note 31 supra.
131. Proposed 28 U.S.C., supra note 96, § 994(b)(2). This is termed "early release eligibility."
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"'certified" programs. Such a system must be structured carefully to
avoid reintroducing indeterminacy. However, the alternative of
merely warehousing large numbers of prisoners, even if effective

programs are discovered, appears less desirable.
PotentialIncrease in Prison Population
There is also serious concern that the single authority model
will lead to a substantial increase in the federal prison popula-

tion.132 If the parole release function is almost totally eliminated
and institutional good time substantially diminished, there is no
guarantee that either the guidelines or judicial sentences will be

sufficiently reduced to shift from the long sentences presently
meted out to the "real time" sentences required.' 33 For example,
concern about a potential adverse public reaction to the appearance
of leniency could induce the Sentencing Commission members and
sentencing judges to be cautious.13 4 Such caution could easily
cause a net rise in actual time served; even small increases could
35
have devastating effects on an already overcrowded system.,
The Dual Authority Alternative

The frankly experimental nature of the single authority model
characterized by S. 1437 contains serious inherent risks. There is
no real need to undertake such risks. A practical approach to re132. As of September 5, 1978, there were 27,923 federal prisoners in Bureau of
Prisons custody; the Bureau of Prisons reports that this is 22.11% over physical capacity. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL PRISON SYSTEM, MONDAY MORNING
HIGHLIGHTS, Sept. 11, 1978, at 7.
133. "Real time" is the period of actual confinement. The maximum sentence
imposed consists of the actual period of confinement plus the period served on parole
or under mandatory release supervision. Under present law, the vast majority of
prisoners are released by parole or mandatory release substantially before completion of the maximum term.
134. This is a particularly troublesome concern, given the substantial diminution of present judicial sentence lengths that would be required. According to figures
provided by the Bureau of Prisons, federal prisoners sentenced to more than one
year serve in custody, on the average, approximately 42% of sentence imposed.
135. From a financial perspective alone, an increase in actual time served from
the present average of 42% to an average of 50% of sentence lengths imposed would
add 52,066 cumulative months in custody yearly, at an estimated cost of $32,940,713
for operational expenditures and an estimated capital construction cost of
$179,743,884 to build the facilities to house such prisoners. These estimates are
based on Bureau of Prison's figures of $7,592 per bed for operational costs and
$39,000 per bed for construction costs, and do not take inflation into account.
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form that avoids the serious problems outlined above is represented by the general direction taken by Oregon and emerging in
the effort of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the House of
Representatives.
Under recent Oregon legislation, 136 an Advisory Commission
on Prison Terms and Parole Standards is created. This Commission
is comprised of a five-member parole board and five judges appointed by the Chief Justice of the Oregon Supreme Court. This
body develops guidelines for use by the parole board in determining the actual duration of prison terms, which are set under
presumptive date procedures. Judges retain authority to determine
the nature of the sentence and its maximum duration. Judicial authority to fix a minimum term is also provided, but such minimum
may be overridden by the affirmative vote of four parole board
members. In addition, judges are required to state reasons for the
sentence imposed, and appellate review upon petition of the defendant is available.
While the Joint Commission and guidelines/presumptive date
provisions are a substantial step forward, in several important respects the Oregon statute does not go far enough. Parole board discretion is structured, but judicial discretion is left unfettered, despite appellate review and the requirement of written reasons. Of
lesser importance, a mechanism for giving credit for institutional
good time is retained, even though the use of presumptive date
procedures would appear to obviate its need.
The legislation reported by the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice' 3 7 goes beyond the Oregon statute. Under this proposal, the Judicial Conference of the United States is directed to
create advisory sentencing guidelines for the specific purpose of
reducing unwarranted judicial sentencing disparity. 138 Judges are
required to furnish written reasons for sentences imposed' 39 and
sentence review upon appeal by the defendant is provided. 140 The
present parole board authority to determine the actual duration of
136. OR. REv. STAT. §§ 144.005-.720 (1977-1978).
137. H.R. 13959, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 101 (1978). Section 101 of the bill, if
enacted, will amend Title 18 of the United States Code regarding, inter alia, sen-

tencing and parole guidelines. All subsequent textual and footnote references to §
101 of the bill are to the proposed section numbers in Title 18 of the United States
Code, and are hereinafter cited as Proposed 18 U.S.C. (House version).
138. Proposed 18 U.S.C. (House version), supra note 137, § 30101.

139. Id. § 30102(b).
140. Id. § 30103.
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confinement within judicially set limits using its guideline system is
retained, 141 and a presumptive date procedure is specifically mandated. 142
Nevertheless, further action in several areas appears warranted. First, the Subcommittee bill does not mandate the Judicial
Conference and Parole Commission to coordinate their guidelines.
While it might be expected that such action would be taken administratively, a specfic mandate to consult regularly for this
purpose, or a Joint Commission model such as that created by
Oregon, is preferable. Second, given the mandate for presumptive
release date procedures, retention of the present relatively complex good time structure is unnecessary. A simpler procedure, providing greater protection from institutional dominance, is to
statutorily require, in lieu of institutional good time, that the original presumptive release date not exceed a certain proportion (e.g.,
eighty percent) of the maximum judicial sentence imposed; and
that, once set, the parole authority may postpone a presumptive
date by up to a given percentage (e.g., twenty percent) of the period of confinement initially set upon a finding of serious institutional misconduct. Third, a clearer division of authority between
the sentencing judge and parole authority appears possible. For example, the disparity caused by uneven application of minimum
sentences in the federal system has been noted as a serious problem at least as far back as 1958.143 Given parole guidelines, judicial
minimums should not be authorized, except perhaps in the most
heinous cases. To the extent that authority for judicial minimum
terms is retained, a parole authority override provision, such as
that incorporated in the Oregon statute, would appear desirable. A
similar argument for a clearer division of authority could be made
concerning the judicial maximum sentence. Absolute division of responsibility could be provided by mandating that once the sentencing judge imposes a prison commitment, full authority is to be
vested in the Parole Commission to determine the presumptive release date within the statutory maximum. If legislative maximum
terms were significantly lower than they presently are, this would
appear an appropriate solution. However, given the exceedingly
high maximums specified by current law, a strong argument can be
141. Id. §§ 41305-41306.
142. Id. § 41308(a).
143. See S. REP. No. 2013, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3891 (1958).
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made that retaining judicial authority to set the maximum, as an
added check, constitutes a wiser approach.'4
SUMMARY

The sentencing power is an awesome one, particularly concerning imposition of prison terms; prudence in legislative reform
is advisable. There appears to be substantial concurrence on the
reform goals desired: greater equity and determinacy. Disagreement centers on the most effective strategy for achieving these
goals. This Article has focused on the differences between the
single and dual authority guideline models, and presents the argument that, from an operational or practical perspective, the dual
authority model-incorporating multiple checks on discretion-is
substantially more likely to produce the actual improvement in
sentencing practices desired.
144. For example, it would appear unnecessary to impose the twenty year statutory maximum currently provided for bank robbery in each case. 18 U.S.C. §
2113(a) (1976). Rather, judicial sentencing guidelines could provide a lower maximum (e.g., 10 years) unless particularly aggravating factors are present. Obviously,
such guidelines would not have to be as complex as those recommending the actual
durational decision. Thus, the problem of consistent implementation noted earlier
should be minimized.
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